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TAXATION-lNcoME TAX-REALIZATION op lNcoME BY CoRPoRATION IN Dxs-

corporation charged off notes as
worthless prior to 1942. Anticipating future collections on the notes, the corporation distributed them as a dividend in kind. The commissioner determined that
the amount collected subsequent to distribution was taxable to the corporation.
The Tax Court held that no income was realized by the corporation.1 On appeal,
TRIBUTION OP NoTEs TO SHAREHOLDERS-A
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First State Bank of Stratford, 8 T.C. 831 (1947).
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held, reversed. This was not a distribution of capital assets but rather an assignment of anticipated income. Commissioner v. First State Bank of Stratford,
(C.C.A. 5th, 1948) 168 F. (2d) 1004, certiorari denied, 335 U.S. 867, 69 S.Ct.
137 (1948).
A distribution of appreciated capital assets as a dividend in kind was held not
to be a realization of income by the corporation in General Utilities & Operating
Co. v. Helvering. 2 Although this view has been uniformly followed, 3 broader
concepts of income have been developed around the core of Helvering v. Horst,4
where it was held that realization of income may be found in the exercise of the
power to procure its payment to another. The Horst doctrine, from its inception
an effective means of limiting surtax avoidance within a family unit, 5 has recently
been used as a weapon against the avoidance of corporate taxation.0 The clear case
of a lease of corporate property in exchange for fixed payments to the lessor's shareholders was held to result in income to the lessor corporation.7 The theory in the
principal case, however, meets more serious difficulties. The property aspect of a
note fits easily into the General Utilities pattern, even though it may represent in
whole or in part a claim to interest. In a recent attemp to tax collections made on
a demand note as income to the donor who had given the note to a charity, the
commissioner relied heavily on the Horst line of cases. The Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals, however, declined to accept this argument and held that the income
was not taxable to the donor since there was no "constructive receipt" of the
income before transfer. 8 The court in the principal case exhibits greater facility
296 U.S. 200, 56 S.Ct. 185 (1935).
ramifications of the General Utilities case and allied problems, see Galvin, "Taxable Income to a Corporation from Dividends in Kind,'' 42 h.L. L. REv. 534 (1947); 3 TAX
L. REv. 250 (1948); 1 TAX L. REv. 86 (1945), with a reply, 1 TAX. L. REv. 93 (1945).
4 311 U.S. ll2, 61 S.Ct. 144 (1940). See Shattuck, "Taxation of Deflected IncomeThe Horst and Eubank Cases,'' 13 RoCKY MT. L. REv. 220 (1941); 41 CoL. L. REv. 340
(1941).
5 See the excellent discussion by Surrey, ''The Supreme Court and the Federal Income
Tax: Some Implications of the Recent Decisions,'' 35 h.L. L. REv. 779 at 784-791 (1941).
See also Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 66 S.Ct. 532 (1946); Commissioner v.
Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 68 S.Ct. 715 (1948); Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 61 S.Ct.
759 (1941) Cf. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 57 S.Ct. 330 (1937).
6 Since great emphasis is placed upon the corporate entity in justifying the double taxation of corporate income, one might ask if avoidance of the corporate tax by formal devices
should be considered in the same manner as individual surtax avoidance'? See Cleary, ''The
Corporate Entity in Tax Cases," 1 TAX L. REv. 3 at 11 (1945); Angell, "Tax Evasion and
Tax Avoidance," 38 CoL. L. REv. 80 (1938).
7 United States v. Joliet & Chi. R. Co., 315 U.S. 44, 62 S.Ct. 442 (1942); Brooklyn
and Richmond Ferry Co., Inc., 9 T.C. 865 (1947).
8 See Commissioner v. Timken, (C.C.A. 6th, 1944) 141 F. (2d) 625, affirming 47
B.T.A. 494 (1942), where the argument of the commissioner was very similar to the reasoning adopted by the court in the principal case. In dismissing this argument the court in the
Timken case said, id. at 629: "It is certain that [donor] had no 'economic benefit' from the
note or interest therein." Accord, Annie A. Colby, 45 B.T.A. 536 (1941). Both of these
cases are distinguishable from the Horst case on the ground that the income was not collected by the donee in the same year the gift was made.
2
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in applying the Horst case and distinguishing the General Utilities doctrine. Since
charging off the notes was a tax benefit, any collections on the notes·were thereafter
taxable as income.9 Therefore, the court concludes this was an assignment of anticipated income and clearly distinguishable from a dividend of appreciated assets.10
This graceful reconciliation would seem to belie the fundamentally different income concepts of the Horst and General Utilities cases.11 It is difficult to see any
substantial difference between a dividend of an asset representing unrealized appreciation and a dividend of an asset representing unrealized but anticipated income. In either case the corporation controls a "potential" gain. The reduction of
the cost basis of the notes by a prior bad debt deduction clearly makes more of the
later collection taxable, but this alone should not change the nature of the assignment from one of an appreciated capital asset to one of future income. It is said
that the corporation received "enjoyment" from the distribution to the shareholders,12 but would it not receive like pleasure in seeing its shareholders reap large
capital gains? While adding doubts as .to the ultimate tax advantage of any dividend in kind under the Horst approach, the principal case indicates an area of
uncertainty in the interpretation of the revenue laws which will breed litigation
and confusion until clarified.
David H. Armstrong, S.Ed.

National Bank of Commerce v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 9th, 1940) 115 F.(2d) 875.
"In the former [General Utilities case], the fruit was on the tree; in the latter [princi•
pal case], the tree itself represents fruit of prior years that was not taxed." Principal case at
1009. Compare Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 at 120, 61 S.Ct. 144 (1940); and the inter•
esting discussion of fruit and trees in Estate of Bertha May Holmes, l T.C. 508 at 512 (1943).
11 Compare the application of the Horst theory to the dividend of appreciated property
in Galvin, "Taxable Income to a Corporation from Dividends in Kind," 42 lr.L. L. R.Bv. 534
at 538 (1947).
·
12 "The payment of dividends to its shareholders was the enjoyment of its income. A
body corporat_e can be said to enjoy its income in no other way." Principal case at 1009. But
note that the court actually held the income is not realized until the money is collected for
the shareholders. Princival case at 1010.
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